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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALD JENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.- Case No. 8369 
FRANK F. MOWER, 
Def.endant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
rrhis action was brought by the plaintiff, who was 
injured on February 2, 1954, at approximately 6:30A.M. 
(Tr. 14), during total darkness '(Tr. 45), while riding in 
defendant's automobile. Plaintiff and defendant were 
fellow employees of the Hill Air Force Base and were 
en route from their homes in Salt Lake City to their 
employment at the time of the accident. 
We respectfully refer the Court to the photograph 
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of the blackboard (Appendix 1), which photograph was 
taken imn1ediately following the trial, for clarification of 
the fallowing : 
·The accident occurred in open country, two 1niles 
North of the Farmington Underpass on U.S. #91 (Tr. 7), 
and 4/10th of a mile North of Shepard's Lane, Davis 
County, Utah (Tr. 9). The scene is a one way (Tr. 9; 1-!) 
two-lane highway, black top (Tr. 8; 9) running Northerly 
frmn the Underpass (Tr. 9). The entire width of the 
highway is 38 feet and has no shoulders (Tr. 10; 13). 
The right or East lane is 22 feet wide (Tr. 11; 13) and the 
West or left lane is 12 feet wide (Tr. 12; 13). Four feet 
inside or East of the West edge of the road are painted 
twc. lines, indicating no crossing over, due to a "barrow 
pit" which separates the North traffic lanes from the 
South traffic lanes (Tr. 9; 10; 13). This "barrow pit" 
or gulley is 3 to 4 feet deep ( Tr. 10; 14) and varies in 
width between the two highways from 10 to 25 feet ( Tr. 
9; 10; 14). At the point of impact, the "barrow pit" was 
about 15 feet wide ('Tr. 9; 14). The two lanes for North-
bound traffic was separated by a painted line ('Tr. 10). 
East of the highway it also drops off into a ''barrow pit" 
(Tr.13;35). 
The n1orning of the accident was cold (Tr. 22) and 
foggy '(Tr. 16), but the highway was clear of snow (Tr. 
43; 44). It had not snowed in the area for 7 to 10 days 
(Tr. 156). The defendant's testimony was that the ap-
pearance of the highway was misleading, as it appeared 
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3 
to be dry, and two other drivers of Northbound vehicles, 
inYolved in accidents at the scene immediately following 
the accident to the defendant's vehicle, also so testified. 
However, the evidence was conflicting on the appearance 
of the highway, other witnesses testifying that the high-
way appeared icy. 
The surface of the road was, in fact, covered with 
a sheet of ice at the scene of the accident (Tr. 41), and 
the testimony was in dispute as to how far South of the 
scene of the accident the icy condition of the road extend-
ed (T·r. 32). The thin layer of ice was apparently de-
posited by the fog, coupled with the cold night (Tr. 15; 
43). 
Prior to the accident, David E. l{enley, also an em-
ployee of Hill Air Force Base, was driving his black or 
blue 1942 Buick automobile in a Northerly direction in 
the outside lane of this one-way highway (Tr. 131; 132). 
He testified that at the Underpass fog had started to 
cloud up his windshield (Tr. 132) to the extent that he 
could not see. The evidence was clear that Mr. Kenley 
stopped his car squarely in the center of the East or 
right lane of travel ( Tr. 26; 29) for the purpose of 
scraping the fog off his windshield (Tr. 33). After 
stopping, he had alighted from his car and had scraped 
his 'vindshield. When he stopped, he noticed that his 
car skidded on the ice (Tr. 134). He intended to scrape 
the ice off and get back in his car before another car 
came along (Tr. 133; 134). 
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The defendant was proceeding Northerly in the East 
or right lane of travel, in the fog and darkness, at a speed 
testified by him at 30-35 MPI-I (Tr. 158), and variously 
estimated by his passengers at 30-40 MPI-I (Tr. 117; 123). 
After passing under the Farmington Underpass and 
proceeding Northerly to a position approaching the 
scene of the accident, he observed tail lights of a 
vehicle ahead (Tr. 158). l-Ie at first thought that the 
vehicle ahead was 1noving North. Mr. Gull, one of the 
passengers riding in the front seat, also saw the tail 
lights and had the same impression ('Tr. 102; 104). When 
the defendant's car reached a distance of approximately 
75 to 100 feet (Tr. 158) he realized that the car ahead 
was stopped. The defendant, not being aware of the 
reason for the car being stopped, in his testimony stated 
"I wanted to slow up and see what was ahead" (Tr. 167; 
173). The defendant turned his car to the left anid. 
applied his brakes to slow down but not to stop (Tr. 
159; 173), when the defendant's car immediately skidded 
on the icy highway, with the result that the rear end 
skidded to the North or to the car's right. The right rear 
of the defendant's vehicle struck the left rear of the stop-
ped Kenley vehicle (Tr. 25). The point of impact was 
10 feet East of the broken white line separating the lanes 
(Tr. 25). The impact caused the defendant to fall out of 
the left door of his vehicle (Tr. 23; 167) onto the higkway, 
after which the driverless car traveled through the "bar-
row pit" on its power, and across the South traffic lanes 
and into a fence adjacent to a railroad right-of-way. 
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David E. I~enley testified that the impact did not 
shove his car at all (Tr. 135), but that after the accident 
1\fr. I~enley drove his car to the East edge of the road 
(Tr. 135). 
To recite what then followed, as well as a brief re-
view of the foregoing, we quote the testimony of Officer 
Grant err. 29), whose resume of the entire accident was 
as follows: 
"The 1942 Buick (Kenley) had stopped in the 
middle of the roadway. The 1947 Nash (Defend-
ant) came driving along behind him, touched his 
brakes, his car went into a skid sideways and hit 
the rear end of the 1942 Buick and careened off on 
the roadway to the left. The 1942 Buick went off 
the roadway towards the East a little ways. While 
that action was taking place there was another 
car that came along." 
''This car applied his brakes and Mr. Reyn-
olds, who was following this unknown car, applied 
his brakes when he saw the taillights of one of the 
cars in front of him and he skidded sideways, hit 
the car "X' as we shall say. ~Ir. Owens, following 
Mr. Reynolds, also applied his brakes, skidded, 
and hit into the rear of Mr. Reynold's car." 
(Words in parentheses added.) 
The facts with relation to the status of the plaintiff 
in defendant's automobile, whether a guest or a passenger 
for hire, is recjted fully at Page 17, Point One of thi~ 
Brief. 
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The driver of the 1942 Buick, Mr. Kenley, was not 
a party defendant to plaintiff's cause of action. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The Appellant respectfully submits four points: 
POINT ONE 
THE PLAINTIFF IS PRESUMED BY LAW TO BE A 
GUEST AND NOT A PASSENGER FOR HIRE, AND PLAIN-
TIFF FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
NECESSARY TO OVERCOME THAT PRESUMPTION. 
POINT TWO 
ASSUMING THE JURY WAS JUSTIFIED IN FINDING 
THE DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT, THE PLAINTIFF, ON 
THOSE SAME FINDINGS WAS .CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLI-
GENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND THE JURY'S VERDICT 
TO THE CONTRARY WAS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT 
OF THE EVIDE~CE. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 12 INVADED 
THE PROVINCE OF THE JURY, AND WAS REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
POINT FOUR 
THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE PREJUDICIALLY ERRON-
EOUS IN THAT THEY WERE CONTRADICTORY AND ·CON-
FUSING AND INCORRECTLY STATED THE LAW. 
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THE PLAINTIFF IS PRESUMED BY LAW TO BE A 
GUEST AND NOT A PASSENGER FOR HIRE, AND PLAIN-
TIFF FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
NE-CESSARY TO OVERCOME THAT PRESUMPTION. 
Before reviewing the facts with relation to plaintiff's 
status as a guest or passenger for hire, we respectfully 
refer the Court to the following Statutes: 
"41-9-2, UCA 1953 ... 'Guest' defined.- For 
the purpose of this section the term 'guest' is here-
by defined as being a person who accepts a ride 
in any vehicle without giving compensation there-
for." 
Title 54, Chapter 6, UCA 1953, regulates the carry-
ing of passengers for compensation on the highways of 
this State. 
''54-6-1, UCA 1953 ... Words and phrases 
defined. - 'Motor vehicle' means any automobile 
. . . used upon any public highway of this state 
for the purpose of transporting persons ... ". 
" 'Common motor carrier of passengers' 
means any person who holds himself out to the 
public as willing to undertake for hire to transport 
by motor vehicle from place to place, persons who 
may choose to employ him." 
"'Contract motor carrier of passengers' 
means any person engaged in the transportation 
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by n1otor vehicle of persons for hire, and not in-
cluded in the tenn common motor carrier of pas-
sengers as hereinabove defined." 
"54-6-3, UCA 1953 ... 'transporting for 
compensation on public highways.' 
"No common or contract motor carrier shall 
operate any motor vehicle for the transportation 
of either persons or property for compensation on 
any public highway in this state, except in accord-
ance with the provisions of this act." 
"54-6-12, UCA 1953 . . . 'Exceptions from 
provisions of act.' No portion of this act shall 
apply: 
"(h) To a group of employees riding to-
gether in the automobile of a fellow employee to 
and from their employment and sharing the actual 
expenses of the transportation; provided that said 
group of employees shall not exceed 5 persons, in 
addition to the driver of the vehicle ... and pro-
vided further that this subsection shall not apply 
to any individual so operating in excess of one 
motor vehicle." 
It shaU be unlawful for any vehicle which is 
oper.ated under awy of said exempt classes to be 
operated for any UAses or purposes no,t falling 
within said exempt classes, except in ~accord(l;!fl(Je 
with the p·rovisions of this act. 
"54-6-18, UCA 195·3 ... violating provisions 
of act a misdemeanor." 
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lt will be noted, upon analyzing the above statutes, 
that the Legislature uses the terms, "for hire" and "for 
compensation" interchangeably. For exainple, in the 
definitions of Common motor carrier of passengers, and 
Contract motor carrier of passengers, the Legislature 
has used the phrase "for hire", while in 54-6-3 (supra) 
the Legislature, specifically referring to "common or 
contract motor carriers", uses the term "for compensa-
tion". 
However, before proceeding further with the analy-
sis of the above statutory provisions in relation to the 
facts of the case at bar, we feel it necessary to point out 
to the Court a very obvious error, caused by oversight, 
which occurred during the passage of suhsection (h) 
54-6-12, V.C.A.1953 (then 76-5-25, U.C.A.1943 as Amend-
ed by Section 4 of Chapter 105, Laws of Utah, 1945). 
The error has to do with the Title to the above 
Amendment as it now appears in Laws of Utah, 1948. 
The House of Representatives Journal, 1948 Special 
Session reveals that the above proposed Amendment was 
introduced as H.B. No. 1, and the Title to the proposed 
Amendment, as well as the proposed text were as follows: 
"An act Amending (the above statute) By 
Adding Thereto A Provision Permitting Casual 
or Occasional Transportation of Persons F·or 
Compensation By A Fellow Employee. 
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(No portion of this Act shall apply:) 
(h) To the casual or occasional transportation 
'of persons for compensation by any person 
not regularly engaged in transportation by 
motor vehicle as his or its principal occupa-
tion or business, nor to the transportation of 
not in excess of 5 persons in addition to the 
driver of the vehicle to and from their daily 
place's of employment by a fellow employee 
not regularly engaged in transportation by 
motor vehicle as his principal occupation or 
business." (Original of H.B. No. 1 now in 
Secretary of State's office.) 
Concurrently with the action of the House in con-
sidering the above bill, the Senate introduced an identical 
bill, ( S.B. No. 4, at page 9, Senate Journal, 1948) except 
that the Title differed as follows: 
"An Act Amending 8ection 76-5-26 (etc.) Re-
lating To The Transportation of Persons And 
Property By Motor Vehicle." 
The House, after adopting some amendments to the 
above text, which are not material here, pas·sed the bill 
and forwarded it to the Senate. 
The Senate referred the bill to its Judiciary Com-
mittee, and at page 43, Senate Journal, 1948, that Com-
Inittee reported: 
"We, your Committee on Judiciary beg leave 
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to report that we have considered H.B. No. 1, by 
Mrs. Ja0k, and in connection therewith we have 
also considered S.B. No. 4, by Senators Selvin, 
Midgley, Farr, Elggren and Knight; that the said 
House and Senate Bills are identical; and that 
after careful consideration of H. B. No. 1, we rec-
ommend that the said bill be amended by str'iking 
all of Section "h" of the bill representing on page 
2, lines 19 to 2'5 inclusive. In place thereof we 
recommend the following language, to wit: 
(h) To a group of employees riding together 
in the automobile of a fellow employee to and from 
their employment and sharing the actual expenses 
of the transportation; provided that said group 
of employees shall not exceed 5 persons, in addi-
tion to the driver of the vehicle, and in no event 
to exceed 3 persons in any one seat, and provided 
further that this subsection shall not apply to 
any individual so operating in excess of one motor 
vehicle." 
On :March 8, 1948 the Senate passed the bill contain-
ing the ahove complete revision of the bill and returned 
it to the House, who on the same day accepted the re-
vision and passed the bill. During this fast action the 
above mistake we refer to occurred. No one apparently 
thought to also strike the language from the Title which 
the Legislature had found objectionable, that is "casual 
or occasional transportation for compensation." 
It is clear, however, that for some very clear and 
definite reason, the Legislature substituted the phrase 
"sharing the actual expenses of the transportation" for 
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the word '' con1pensation." 
It seen1s ahnost superfluous to state that the Legis-
lature having found the language in the text objection-
able, and having stricken it from the text, most certainly 
intended also to strike it from the Title. Their failure to 
so do can only be explained as an inadvertent oversight. 
To now maintain that the Title, as it now appears in 
Laws of Utah, 1948, despite the above mistake, clearly 
expre'Sses the subject of the hill, would not only be 
erroneous, but would leave the Aet open to valid attack 
as unconstitutional, in violation of Article VI, Sec. 23, 
Constitution of Utah. If, in fact, this Court cannot by 
Judicial Interpretation, overlook and "strike" the words 
in the Title, which the Legislature did in the text, and 
thereby ignore the words "casual", '·'occasional", and 
"for compensation", then we in fact contend that, in that 
event, the Act as it now appears in Laws of Utah, 1948, is 
unconstitutional. This for the re'a:son that the Act says 
nothing about casual or occasional transportation, and 
as we submit hereafter, it clearly infers from its text, 
that the sharing of the actual expenses by the fellow em-
ployees shall not be deemed "compensation." The Title, 
as it now appears, therefore, without the judicial inter-
pretation which we have submitted, is in violation of the 
Constitution, Article VI, Section 23. 
The Title, however, can be amended to comply with 
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the intent of the Legislature, by simply striking the words 
found offensive by the Legislature in the text, but which 
they failed to also strike from the Title, in which event 
the Title would read: 
''An Act Amending (the statute) By Adding 
Thereto A Provision Permitting The Transporta-
tion of Persons By A F'ellow Employee." 
As thus amended, in compliance with the intent of 
the Legislature, the Title clearly expresses the subject 
of the Act, and there could be no valid attack on consti-
tutional grounds. 
For the above reasons, we continue our analysis of 
the statutes quoted at page 7 of thjs brief, in light with 
the facts in the case at bar, and disregard the Title to 
the Act. 
The Legislature clearly decided in adopting the 
exception to the Motor Vehicle Transportation Act, 54-6-
12 (h) (supra) page 8, in effect that as long as the 
fellow-employees were sharing the actual expenses of 
the transportation, the driver-employee was not re-
ceiving "compensation" for the transportation; he was 
not operating a vehicle "for hire", and the driver-em-
ployee therefore did not have to comply with the provi-
sions of the act. 
And conversely, if the driver-employee charged his 
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fellow-employee riders more than their share of the ac-
tual expenses of the transportation, then the driver-
enlployee would be operating a vehiele ''for hire" or 
·'for c01npensation", in which event he would be guilty 
of a i\lisden1eanor, unless he fully complied with the other 
provisions of the ~lotor Yehicle Transportation Act. 
That interpretation is obvious, and not subject to 
valid question, as the Legislature, following the list of 
exceptions, stated, supra, page ______ : 
"It shall be wnlawful for any vehicle which 
is operated under any of said exempt classes to be 
operated for any uses (sharing the actual ex-
penses) or purposes (riding to and from employ-
Inent) not falling within said exempt classes, 
exoept iJn accordance with the provisions of this 
act." (parentheses and e1nphasis added) 
Certainly it could not be suggested that the Legis-
lature intended to limit the defendant here from bargain-
ing for the best price possible as a fare to be charged his 
fellow-employee riders; limit him strictly to accepting 
from each e1nployee-rider his pro rata share of the actual 
expenses of operating the defendant's own automobile; 
expect the defendant to also pay his own share of the 
expenses, inasmuch as the statutory· phrase is "sharing 
the actual expenses"; and at the same time increase the 
liability of the defendant to that of a person who operates 
a vehicle for hire. 
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rl 1hl' questio.n, then, simply resolves itself into 
whether the defendant charged the plaintiff more than 
the plaintiff's share of the actual·expenses (in which ca;-;e 
the plaintiff would be deemed a passenger for hire), or 
whether the defendant charged the plaintiff his share 
of thP artual expenses (in which event the plaintiff would 
not be deemed a passenger for hire, but a mere guest, 
and not entitled !o recover from the defendant.) 
The burden .of proof, without question, was upon 
the plaintiff to overcome the legal presumptions in favor 
of the defendant, that the plaintiff was a g-uest, under 
the statutes quoted above. 
RIGGS YR. ROBERTS, (Idaho) 264 Pac. 2nd 698, 
at page 703: 
"Appellant did not sustain the burden of 
proof resting on him to es.tahlish that such con-
sideration passed to Respondent- for transporting-
Appellant on this trip as to make him a passenger, 
not a guest." 
HASBROOK VS. WINGATE, (Ohio) 10 ALR2134~ 
at page 1346 : 
''Since the liability of the motorist host to a 
person riding with him depends on the status of 
the latter, he, the latter, has the burden to estab-
lish such relationship ... " 
Vol. 9C, Blashfield, Cycl. of Auto. Law and Practice, 
Sec. 6115, page 88: 
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"Normally, when the vehicle is a private a~to­
Inobile, not usually occupied as a common earner, 
it is assurned that the occupants are gu·ests, and 
it is incumbent upon the occupant to prove that 
he is a passenger for hire." 
And again at S.ec. 6146, page 16'5: 
"Automobile guest statutes, widely prevalent 
at the present time, preclude an injured guest 
from recovering against the host for ordinary 
negligence and for this or other reasons, the oe-
cupant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident 
may seek to prove that he was not a guest, but on 
the contrary had some status other than that co~ 
temp,lated by statrutes, and in this situation the 
burden of proof is upon the plaintiff." (emphasis 
adld~d) -
In accord, see 
JENKINS vs. NAT'IONAL PAINT & V AR-
·NISH CO., 7 Cal. App. 2nd 161, 61 Pac. 
2nd 780; 
PILCHE·R vs. ERNY, 155 Kan. 257, 124 Pac. 
2nd 461; 
MILLER vs. MILLER, 395 Ill. 273, 69 NE 
2nd 878; 
BURNS vs. 8TORCHAK, 331 Ill. App. 347, 
73 NE 2nd 168. 
The burden upon the plaintiff is even more apparent 
when, as in the case at bar, the defendant is presumed by 
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law to be acting legally within the provisions of the stat-
utes heretofore cited, and the law will not presume tha•t 
the defendant's act in accepting money from the plaintiff 
for his transportation, is a violation of the statute. 
20 Am. Juris., Evidence, Sec. 226, at page 221, states: 
''The law presumes, in the absence of proof to 
the contrary, that everyone obeys the law and dis-
charges the duties imposed by law upon him, espe-
cially when a violation constitutes a criminal of-
fense. It is presumed that the co:p.duct of men is 
lawful ... and that they do not intend to violate 
the law. Noncompliance with, or nonobservance 
of, the statutory law ... will not be presumed." 
A review of the testimony and evidence produced 
by the plaintiff at the trial of this action, feU far short 
of the evidence that would be necessary to sustain the 
burden of proof requisite to even make the question one 
of fact for the jury, let alone a ruling as a matter of law 
in his favor. To sustain this proposition, we review in 
detail, the entire testimony bearing on the status of the 
plaintiff as a passenger for hire, or a guest. 
(Tr. 2-5) The plaintiff first called the defendant, 
Frank F. Mower, as an adverse witness under Rule 43, 
URCP, and he testified that he lived at 1068 East 17th 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and had worked at the Hill 
Air Force Base since June of 1953. He had driven his 
car to work five days a week since working there. He 
first became acquainted with the plaintiff, Mr. Jensen, on 
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Tuesday qf ~the week prior to the accident and had,. prior 
tq that time, carr:i~d fellow en1ployees back· and forth 
with hin1 to I:Iill Field frmn Salt Lake City. Just before 
he met plaintiff he had vacancies in his car for pas-
sengers. 
(Tr. ·3) 
"Q. ·And in line with that~ ·did you _advertise for 
passengersf 
A. Well,. they have a bulletin board there that is 
. , used especially for that. That is a regular 
thing and if a person has vacancies why they 
post a bulletin on this bulletin board and 
. people that want. a ride can get in contact with 
them." · · . . 
The defendant te.stifie·d the notice said something to 
the effect, "Riders from Salt Lake wanted," with his 
name on it. 
The day follo.wing t.he posting. of the notice, Mr. 
Jensen, the plaintiff, came to the defendant and asked 
the defendant if he had room for the plaintiff to ride and 
the defendant replied "yes". 
(Tr. 4) . 
"Q. And what was said about the cost of the 
transportation? 
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A. 'There was nothing said about it. That was 
more or less a standard thing. That was the 
bus fare rate. 
Q. That was understood that he should pay you 
for it? 
A. Yes. They all pay. 
Q. And did he pay you at all for any of his trans-
portation? 
A. No. I don~t remember him ever paying any-
thing .. He sent his boy down after you sent 
me a letter to appear in Court to try to pay 
me bu~ I ~idn't acce·pt it. 
Q. But there were some arrangements made, I 
take it, to pay you? 
A. Well, it was a standing idea that people wl10 
ride are supposed to stand part of the ex-
pense." 
The defendant testified that the plaintiff, during his 
first ride with defendant, agreed to pay $3.50 per week, 
and the payments would be made on pay day. 
(Tr. 5) 
"Q. And was he to pay you that amount whether 
he rode or not? 
A. Well, that was the standard bus arrangement. 
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Q. Well, I take it he was supposed to pay you 
whether he rode or not. 
A. 'Well, he didn't pay me because he only rode 
three days. 
Q. But he agreed to pay you whether he rode or 
not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In other words, if he missed a day he was to 
pay you? 
A. That would be the ge·neral idea."· 
The plaintiff testified his address wa:s 46'6 E'ast 13th 
South, Salt Lake City ('Tr. 69), and that (Tr. 70-72) he 
was employed at Hill Air Force Base. On Tuesday or 
Wednesday before the accident he went to the bulletin 
board and observed the card with Mr. Mower's name on it 
and contacted Mr. Mower. 
(Tr. 71) 
''I asked him if he still had room and he said 
'yes' and he asked me where I lived and I told 
him and he says that was good because that 
'Would be on his route, he wouldn't have to go 
out of the way to pick me up. 
Q. And was anything said that time about 
whether you were to pay him or not 1 
A. No. I went back to work but when I asked 
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him the first day I rotle with him, which was 
Thursday, I asked him the11 how much and ... 
he said 70c a ride and you pay Nhether you 
go or not, as long as the car goes, and I told 
him, 'okeh'." 
On cross-examination (Tr. 94-96) the plaintiff fur-
ther testified that he took another employee, Mr. Wil-
liams, to the defendant, inasmuch as Mr. Williams was 
also seeking a ride. The bus fare from Salt Lake to 
Hill Field and return was 70c per round trip, and that 
was the amount he agreed to pay Mr. Mower, or 35c each 
way. He had previously ridden with someone else who 
had charged 90c for the same distance, and he did not 
know what Mr. Mower was going to charge until he talked 
to him. The plaintiff had previously driven hi·s own ve-
hicle while his wife was also working at the Hill Air 
Force Base, but discontinued driving because his wife 
was laid off, his car needed overhauling, and further that 
it was too e.'Cpensiv.e to drive his own car alone to and 
from Hill Field. He had ridden with Mr. Mower, the 
defendant, three days before the day of the accident 
The defendant carried three fellow-employees in his 
automobile; namely, Mr. Jensen, Mr. Gull and Mr. Wil-
liams. 
The above is a complete resume of the entire testi-
mony of the plaintiff's case with relation to his status as 
an alleged passenger for hire. 
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A~ the close of t~~ pl~intiff's ca.se, the defendant 
moved for a dis1nissal· of the: actiQn on the ground that 
the plaintiff had not produced evidence which would re-
lieve the plaintiff from the provisions of Section 41-9-1, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, commonly called "The Guest 
Statute," and the motion, with no argument permitted, 
was taken under advise1nent and later, of course, denied. 
During the def~ndant's case, in chief, the defend-
ant again testified (Tr. 153-154). , His testimony, how-
ever, added nothing to what had previously been testified. 
It will be noted that no where· in plaintiff's evidence 
did he deem it necessary to even advise the Court of ·the 
distance travelletl. by the plaintiff in defendant's car·each 
day, this fact being material for the obvious reason that 
for example, 70c for it trip of 100 niiles would bear a dif-
ferent analysis than a trip of 10 miles.· 
Nowhere did plaintiff deem it necessary to inqUire 
into the actual cost of the transportation, although this 
information could have been readily available before trial 
through the -discovery procedures provided in the Utah 
Rules· of Civil Procedure; and at the trial, could have 
been determined by the simple expediency of asking the 
defendant while he was on the stand. 
The plaintiff's ca~~, boiled down to its basic elements, 
simply is this: that the plaintiff paid to defendant, his 
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fellow-employee, 70c per day for a round t:rip ·transpor-
tation to and from employ1nent, an undisclosed distance, 
the rides to be five times a week, but the expenses of 
operating the car are not disclosed; that the above evi-
dence sustains the burden ·of proof showing that the de-
fendant was commi-tting a Misdemeanor, in violation of 
54-6-12 (h), supra, page·8. 
vVe feel certain, quite to the contrary, that the plain-
tiff wholly failed to sustain the burden of proof, and that 
the Honorable Court below erred in denying plaintiff's 
motion for a dislJlissal of th~ action. 
In the. event that· plaintiff. feels, ·h~wever", that natu.ral 
infe:t;ences.can be drawn in light with th.e plaintiff's testi-
mony and evidence, coupled with facts based on common 
knowledge, we, too, gladly. ar~ive at those inference.s and 
conclusions. 
This distance from Salt Lake City to Hill Air F·orce 
Base near Ogden, Utah, is definite and not subject to 
dispute. The State of Utah Road Commission publica-
tion, Appendix B, shows it to be 25.3 miles (by adding 
the distances note1d on the :q1ap), the measurement from 
Salt Lake City starting at the Brigham Young Monument 
at South Temple Street and Main Street. The plaintiff 
resided at 456 East 13th South Street (Tr. 69), or 13 
blocks south and 4¥2 blocks east of the Monument, total 
blocks, 17th. It is common knowledge that there are eight 
Salt Lake City blocks to the mile. 
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By simple arithmetic, therefore, an accurate compu-
tation of the distance traveled from the plaintiff's home 
to work and return can be determined as follows: 
Official miles to Hill Fieid-25.3 
Round trip ----------··············-········-··-···········50.6 Mi. 
Additional distance, plaintiff's home to 
Monument, round trip-35 blocks, 
divided by 8 (blocks to mile)................ 4.4 Mi. 
Total miles per day .......................... 55 Mi. 
It can, therefore, be properly inferred from the 
above that the plaintiff was paying 70c per day for at 
least 55 miles transportation in def,endant's automo!bile, 
or 1.3c per mile. If we assume that each occupant in the 
defendant's car contributed the same amount; the total 
'contribution would be equal to 5.2c per mile, and the 
defendant would be contribut.ing one-fourth of that sum 
towards the expense of opBrating his own vehicle. 
Or, if we give the plaintiff more than a benefit of 
the doubt, and assume that the entire distance, from his 
home to Hill Field was only 25 miles, or 50 miles round 
trip, the 70c per day contribution by him amounted to 
1.4c per mile. On this again, if all the occupants contri· 
buted the same amount, a total of 5.6c per mile would be 
contribute(}, one-fourth of which the defendant would be 
paying. And if the expenses of the transportation actu· 
ally exceeded that amount, the defendant, of cours·e, 
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would have to pay all the additional expense, as well 
as the one-fourth mentioned. 
'rhe plaintiff contends, and the Honorable District 
Court has agreed as a matter of law, that the plaintiff, 
under the above facts, gave ''compensation" to the de-
fendant for his rides, within the meaning of the Guest 
and :Motor Vehicle Transportation Acts (supra, page 
7), and that the plaintiff sustained the burden of proof 
to show that the arrangement between the parties was not 
merely a convenient method for sharing the actual ex-
penses. 
It is so well known that the Court can take judicial 
notice of the fact that a modern automobile cannot pos-
sibly be operated as economically as 5c per mile-not in 
these times of 30c gasoline, 45c oil, $1.'50 lubrication, 
$20.00 to $30.00 tires, coupled with the increased cost of 
repairs, insurance, and rapid depreciation of originally 
high priced automobiles. But in ord~r to believe that the 
defendant, under this arrangement, was receiving "com-
pensation'' it would have to be ruled, as a matter of law, 
that the defendant's vehicle could be operated at a sub-
stantially lower amount than 5c per mile, in which event 
the defendant was charging the plaintiff and his two 
other fellow-employees more than their share of the ac-
tual expenses. Such a contention would, in our opinion, 
be ridiculous. 
Again we state, that to agree with the contention of 
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the plaintiff, and the rulings of the Court below, would 
be to agree that the Legislature intended to restrict and 
prohibit the employee-driver from bargaining with fel-
low-employee riders for a profit, ("compensation"); 
limit him to. ac~epti:rig from each employe~~-r~der his pr~­
rata share of. the actual expel1'Ses of the .transportation; 
insi~t that the drive-r also pay his share of the expenses 
of his own vehicie ; but. at the same_ time impose _upon the 
employee-driver the increased liability of a person. actUr-
ally operating a vehicle fo_r hire. 
There is, of course, a vast maze of opinions from 
other jurisdictions, interpreting the local Guest Statute·s 
in light with the innumerable fact situations which have 
been presented. 
-An attempt here: to reconcile the. apparent conf1ict 
in the decisions, in our: opinion, woUld be· both futil"e and 
~ ~ 
unnecessary." .In' out· se-arch of the_ precedents, we ·h.aye 
found ~<? "cas'e from ariy -'j~ri~dictiori. _w)lerein' ~ s~tute, 
even.· -~~mil~r Eo- o~r 5_4-6~12 _ <:h). uc_~, 1_9-5.3, has even be~n 
mentioned. 
Furthermore; the cases inyolving -fellow-employees, 
sharing expenses for the transportation to and from 
work, are surprisingly fewin.comP'aris'On. But even these 
cases could not possibly be controlling or of interest to 
this Court, unless, in those cases, the Court was also 
interpreting a similar sta~ute .. 
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.. _But despite the c.onfli~ting decisions, the Courts are 
quite uniform ·in thei~ holdings concerning the general 
principles of law which govern, the conflict being in the 
interpretation of those principles in light with the facts 
of eac~ case. These gen~r~l principles can be classified 
a~ follows: 
1. THE MERE SHARING OF EXPENSES ALONE IS 
NOT ENOUGH, OF ITSELF, TO ESTABLISH 
THE RIDER AS A PASSENGER FOR HIRE, 
RATHER THAN A GUEST. 
The Utah SuJ?reme Court, in DERRICK vs. SALT 
LAKE AND 0. RY. CO., 168 Pac. 335, while not inter-
preting the Guest Statute, which of course was not then 
enacted, has recognized the above principle. In that case, 
Merritt, the driver, accompanied by two other salesmen, 
plaintiff and· one Leggett, were en route from Salt Lake 
City to Ogden, Utah .. The t~ree -~en had previously 
agreed to each pay his share of the .. actua1 expenses of the 
trip, and during the trip, the car was struck by a train, 
and the plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff brought suit 
against the defendant railroad. Th~ three salesmen rep-
resented different companies, and the lower court held 
that the relationship of carrier .and passenger existed 
bet\veen the driver and his passenger~. 
On these ·almost identical facts to the· case at bar. 
the Utah Supreme Court states>at page 337 :_· . 
. -. 
"The (lower) Court ... charged (the jury) ·on 
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the theory that the relation of carrier and pas-
senger existed between Merritt (driver) and the 
plaintiff. This was error." 
The Supreme Court then held that the parties were 
joint adventurers and the balance of the decision is in-
applicable to the case at bar, as there was no issue in the 
plaedings, or at the trial on this theory. 
The above ruling of this Court has never b'een over-
ruled. 
The following citations are also in accord: 
RIGGS vs. ROBERTS, (Idaho) supra, page 15. 
"The Oourts have quite uniformly held that 
merely paying for gas and oil is not of itself and 
alone sufficient to establish passenger status." 
(Case's cited at '264 Pac. 2nd 700) 
In McGANN vs. HOFFMAN, 70 Pac. 2d 909, at Page 
912, the Court states : 
"The great weight of authority is to the effect 
that the sharing of the cost of gasoline and oil 
consumed on a trip, when that trip is taken for 
pleasure or social purposes, is nothing more than 
the exchange of social amenities and does not 
transform into a passenger one who without such 
e·xchange would be a guest, and consequently is 
not payment for the transportation or compensa-
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tion within the meaning of the Statute. It is ob-
vious that if a different result obtained under any 
construction of the Statute, its purposes would be 
defeated and its e,ffect annulled. The relationships 
which will give rise to the status of a passenger 
must confer a benefit of a tangible nature and 
are limited." 
In OLEFSlCY vs. LUDWIG, (NY) 272 NYS 158 in 
construing the Connecticut Statute, held that as a matter 
of law contribution to the expenses of gasoline, oil, and 
garage does not constitute payment within the meaning 
of that Statute. 
In VOELKEL vs. LATIN (Ohio) 16 NE 2 519: 
"The guest statute should not be rendered 
practically void by holding that a contribution to 
common expenses of friendly parties made those 
so contributing exempt from its effect." 
In Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and 
Practice, Vol. 4, Part 1, Sec. 2292 at Page 318: 
"The mere sharing of expenses has been held 
not to constitute the giving of compensation within 
the meaning of the Statute, and the fact that the 
rider pays part of the expenses of the trip does 
not necessarily prevent him from being regarded 
as a guest." 
In 5 Amer. Juris.-Automobiles (Pocket Parts) Sec. 
239 at Page 99: 
''The mere fact that the owner or operator 
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of the car receives 1noney as a result of carrying 
the plaintiff does not necessarily entitle the plain-
tiff to the status of a passenger for hire, if the 
1noney is not received as compensation for the 
transportation, and the transportation was not in-
duced by the expectation of such cash payment." 
Therefore, if in the case at bar, the defendant sought 
only to secure from the plaintiff for the transportation, 
the plaintiff's share of the actual expenses, which the law 
presumes to be the case, and which the facts and the in-
ferences drawn therefrmn clearly indicate, then the 
money was not received as compensation and the trans-
portation was not "induced by the expectation of such." 
2. TO CONSTITUTE "COMPENSATION" THE ·CON-
TRIBUTION FROM THE RIDER TO THE DRIV-
ER MUST BE SUBSTANTIAL IN NATURE. 
"The authorities· are likewise quite uniform 
to the effect that to constitute one a passenger, 
not a guest ... there must be contributed by the 
passenger to the driver of the car something sub-
stantial and of worth to the driver, i.e., commer-
cial, not mere courtesy . . . In other words, the 
driver must be actuated by a benefit of substantial 
value ... to make the rider a passenger." Riggs 
vs. Roberts (Supra, page 15). 
In ALBRE'CHT vs. SAFEWAY STORES (Ore.) 80 
Pac. 2nd 62, the Court states that the test is "whether 
some substantial benefit has been conferred upon the 
owner or operator of the motor vehicle as compensation 
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for the transportation. If there was, the person being 
transported is not a guest.'' 
HASBROOK_ vs. \VINGATE, (Ohio) supra, page 15. 
"The general rule is that if the transportation 
of a rider confers a benefit only on the person to 
whom the ride is given and no benefits other than 
such as are incidental to hospitality, good will, or 
the like on the person furnishing the transporta-
tion, the rider is a guest .... " 
Apparently plaintiff contends that his arrangement 
with the defendant was a cold business proposition, and 
not in the nature of friendship or courtesy. It is true that 
the parties did not know each other before they arranged 
for the plaintiff to ride. But isn't it just as logical to also 
assume that there is a fraternity of fellowship among 
fellow workers who have common problems of empl'OY-
ment, transportation, and the like. Isn't it true that this 
is brought out by the very fact that at the first meeting 
of these parties, not one word was spoken about the cost 
to plaintiff of the transportation; that the defendant in 
fact accepted 20c less per day from the plaintiff than 
plaintiff had paid previously. That certainly would 
tend to indicate that the defendant was not attempting to 
get "all that the traffic would bear" fr,om his riders. 
Further, the fact that the Legislature has placed its 
stamp of approval on the arrangement clearly indicates 
that Public Policy, in this State, where there are several 
Defense Establishments, as well as huge copper, steel and 
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mining corporations, is in favor of assisting the en1ploy-
ees in economically and conveniently getting to and from 
their employment. 
3. THE RIDER IS DEEMED A GUEST UNLESS 
THERE WAS A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES CLEARLY INDICATING TO THE PAR-
TIES THAT THE RIDER WAS A PASSENGER, 
AND THAT THE DRIVER KNEW, OR SHOULD 
HAVE KNOWN, THAT HIS LIABILITY TO THE 
RIDER ENTAILS THAT OWING TO A PAS-
SENGER FOR HIRE. 
HASBROOK vs. WINGATE (Ohio) 10 ALR 21342 
at Page 134'5: 
"The Ohio Guest Act and similar acts in other 
states were undoubtedly enacted to carry out a 
policy of social equity to the effect that the owner 
or operator of an automobile should not be made 
liable to a guest riding therein to whom the owner 
or operator is doing a favor or is extending a 
courtesy, except for wilful or wanton misconduct 
on his part, and that a guest should assume the 
risk of ordinary negligence or acts which are less 
culpable than wilful or wanton mis·conduct. That 
being the spirit of the enactment, the motorist 
sh01dd be ac'C'orded the status which incurs the 
lesser liability umless his status is clearly and 
definitely changed by express consent or by facts 
constituting acquiescenc;e on his p:art to a status 
which entails the greater liability." 
RIGGS vs. ROBERTS, (Idaho) supra, page 15: 
"The authorities indicate there must be a mu" 
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tual understanding reasonably clear to both the 
rider and the driver before the trip is undertaken, 
that the rider's relationship to the driver is that of 
a passenger and not a mere guest." 
Again, in the case at bar, can it be said that the 
defendant, in compliance with the statute that permits the 
carrying of feHow-employees to and from work, would 
be deemed, as a matter of law, to understand that in so 
complying, he was placing himself in a position of prac-
tically insuring the safety of his riders, the same as if he 
flaunted the law, and charged each rider $5.00 per day, 
carried 10 passengers and operated two or more auto-
mobiles in violation of the Statute? The answer, of 
course, is obvious. Quite the contrary, he would certainly 
assume, and be correct, that a'S long as he drove his car 
within the intent and meaning of the statutory exception, 
his liability to the o~cupants would not be increased over 
his liability to any other guest. 
The above three general principles of law, therefore, 
read in light with the statutes of this state heretofore 
cited and discussed, strongly and definitely are in accord 
with the defendant's contention here, that the plaintiff 
was a guest occupant in the defendant's automobile at 
the time of the accident, and that the plaintiff failed to 
establish at the trial that he was a passenger for hire. 
Another clear indication of the intent of the Legis-
lature is found in The Pocke,t Supplement Volume 6, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
U.C.A., 1953, following 54-6-12 (h), which contains a new 
provision requiring those vehicles in the '•exempt classes" 
which are operated for hire to carry liability insurance on 
the rell icl c for hire. A reading of the Title to this Act, 
Laws of 1-tah, 1953 at page 242, as well as the text, defi-
nitely shows that the employee-drivers, under subsection 
(h) are not required to carry this insurance, as the legis-
lature did not classify the1n as operating a vehicle for 
hire. 
"An Act Amending Sections 54-6-12 and 54-6-
17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, Regarding Safety 
And Inspection of Motor Vehicles, Reporting of 
Accidents, Providing For Public Liability And 
Property Damage Insurance, And Elimination of 
Cargo Insurance For Contract Motor Carriers 
For Hire." 
It shall be unlawful for any vehicle which is 
operated under any of said exempt classes to be 
operated upon the public highways of this state, 
for hire; without a public liability policy (in cer-
tain amounts) for liability arising out of the op-
eration of said vehicle fo·r hire; ... or, to be oper-
ated for any us·es or purposes not falling within 
said exempt classes, except in accordance with the 
prorvisions of this act." 
Now, certainly it cannot be contended that the Legis-
lature having specifically restricted the employee-driver 
from charging his riders a fare, at the same ti1ne meant 
to designate his vehicle a "vehicle for hire." The Legis-
lature could not have intended such a contradictory thing. 
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They most certainly would have left the words "for com-
pensation" in the original H.B. No. 1 and not specifically 
stricken those words for the present phrase, "sharing 
the actual expenses of the transportation." 
The new insurance requirement applies only to those 
classes in the "exempt classes" which are in fact ''vehicles 
for hire," such as class (g) which includes taxis, ambu-
lances, etc. It does not and could not apply with relation 
to those classes which were not deemed to constitute "ve-
hicles for hire," such a·s class (d), vehicles of an Agri-
cultural Cooperative Association, being used in its non 
profit activities; or class (e), vehicles owned and oper-
ated by the United States, or the State of Utah. 
The insurance requirement could not possibly, there-
fore apply to class (h) as the very wording of that sub-
section prohibits the employee-driver from charging more 
than the occupant's actual share of the cost. 
\Ve have discussed the insurance requirement for a 
reason other than to point out the above intent of the 
Legislature. The other reason is to call the Court's atten-
tion to a very definite "trap" into which the thousands 
of employee-drivers in this state have fallen, should the 
Court reject the defendant's contention here. 
It is common knowledge that the standard liability 
policy issued by all companies on private passenger ve-
hicles carries the exclusion declaring the policy void 
if the vehicle is used a:s a "public or livery conveyance." 
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If, then, the employee-driver has fully con1plied with 
the provisions of 54-6-12 (h); has secured the standard 
liability insurance policy; has not paid the greatly in-
creased premium necessary for a vehicle for hire (there 
being no legal requirement that he do so) ; and should 
the Court now hold that he has, under the intent and 
meaning of the above statute, in fact been operating a 
vehicle for hire, the employee-driver is without insurance 
protection completely. And this, even though he has 
scrupulously complied with every portion of the law. 
If the Legislature meant such an interpretation, they 
would most certainly have permitted the employe€s in 
class (h) to carry passengers for compensation, and 
would not have stricken "compensation" from the Act. 
'It is therefore clear and without doubt, that the 
plaintiff wholly failed to sustain the burden of proof 
necessary to relieve hi1nself of the provisions of the 
Guest Statute, and that the Honorabl€ District Court 
erred in denying defendant''S Motion for dismissal of the 
action at the close of plaintiff's case, and in further re-
fusing to direct a verdict in favor of defendant at the 
close of all the evidence. 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that defend-
ant 1s entitled, in justice, to a reversal of the judgment, 
and an entry of judgment in his favor, No cause of 
Action. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
POINT II 
ASSUMING THE JURY WAS JUSTIFIED IN FINDING 
THE DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT, THE PLAINTIFF, ON 
THOSE SAME FINDINGS WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLI-
GENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND THE JURY'S VERDICT 
TO THE CONTRARY WAS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT 
OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The plaintiff having prevailed at the trial, we must, 
of course, consider the evidence with relation to the 
question of defendant's negligence in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff. 
WEENIG BROS. v. MANNING (Utah) 262 P. 
2d at 492; 
GIBBS v. BLUE CAB, INC. (Utah) 249 P. 2d 213. 
With that test in mind, we summarize the favorable 
evidence to plaintiff. 
The fog was very thick, and the accident occurred 
1n total darkness. On this the evidence was clear, the 
only variance in the testimony being as to the distance 
the defendant could see ahead. 
The plaintiff testified (Tr. 72) that when he entered 
the car it was foggy, and this was confirmed by the testi-
mony of the other witnesses. Officer Grant ( Tr. 16) -
"It was a very heavy fog that morning."; Officer Evans 
(Tr. 44) - " ... it was very, very thick that morning. 
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I have seen it a little thicker, but not 1nany times."; 
\Vitness Gull (Tr. 102) ~"The visibility was very bad"; 
Witness Everley (Tr. 109) -"It was thick. You didn't 
even know you were by Slim Olsen's until you got under-
neath the lights .... It was a dense f'og"; Witness 
Williams (Tr .120) -"It was very foggy. I think it was 
extremely foggy"; Witness Reynolds ( Tr. 149) - "It 
was very d.ense"; Witness Owens (Tr. 138) - "It was 
very foggy." 
As to visibility through the fog, the testimony varied 
as follows: 
Officer Grant (Tr. Hi) - "approximately one hun-
dred feet"; Officer Evans (Tr. 40) - "Somewhere in 
the neighborhood of 100 feet; maybe slightly less, maybe 
a little more in places."; Witness Gull (Tr. 102) - "I 
could see a short distance ahead and down along the side 
of the road."; Witness WilHams (Tr. 120) - "on the 
highway, I think we could see 40 to 50 feet"; Witness 
Everley (Tr. 109) :-"I would say 50 to 75 feet"; De-
fendant l\1:ower (Tr. 156) -"I would estimate 75 to 100 
feet. ... "; Wit~ess R,eynolds (Tr. 147) -"I would say 
50 feet"; Witness Owens (Tr. 139) - "75 to 100 feet". 
The speed of defendant's car was indicated as fol-
lows: 
The plaintiff testified (Tr. 75) -"Well, I couldn't 
see the speedometer, but I assume we was going close, 
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right around 40 miles per hour .... I just had that 
opinion"; vVitness Gull (Tr.117) -"Theway I had it in 
mind was somewhere around 40 lliiles a11 hour; that is 
between 35 and 40"; Witness Williams (Tr. 123) -"I 
looked at the speedometer. I was frankly nervous, and 
it showed 39 miles an hour." 
The appearance of the roadway, whether it appeared 
icy or dry, was at issue. rrhe testimony was very contra-
dictory, but the foUowing witnesses testified that the 
road appeared icy: 
Officer Grant (Tr. 15) in answer to the question, 
"and how could you tell" (the road was icy), answerecl 
"By looking at the roadway. There was a glare on the 
roadway that was normally absent on a dry road"; Offi-
cer Evans ( Tr. -!~)) ..,.- "I knew the road was slick because 
when I came onto the highway it appeared to be slick"; 
Witness Williams (rrr. 12'2) - "Well, it was a wd fog 
and did look slippery". 
Despite the fact that witnesses Gull (Tr. 104); Ever-
ley (who said the road appeared wet) (Tr. 110 and 112); 
Witness Owens (Tr. 139·-140); Witness Reynolds (Tr. 
146-147), as weB as the defendant, all testified the road-
way appeared dry, we will assume for the purpose of this 
argument only that the above testimony apparently would 
be sufficient for the jury to find that the appearance 
was that of an icy roadway. 
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As to the windows of the car, and particularly with 
relation to the accun1ulation of fog on the windshield, the 
testin1ony, favorable to the plaintiff and adverse to the 
defendant, was as follows: 
\Vitness Williams (Tr. 120) - "the windshield was 
fogged up"; (Tr. 121) - "up towards the Farmington 
Underpass it (right windshield) was quite foggy .... 
There was very little heat and just a sma:ll opening ( m 
the left windshield) about one foot in diameter . . . kind 
of an oval opening" ; ( Tr. 127) 
Q. "The right side was worse than the left~" A. 
"Yes. I don't think it (the defroster) was working, he-
cause the other side was completely fogged up. A lot of 
(the fog) was on the inside and some of it on the outside . 
. . . There was frozen fog on the outside." (Tr. 129) 
"Through the small opening (in the left windshield) it 
was clear.'' 
The plaintiff confirmed the above condition of the 
windshield, and testified the other windows were com-
pletely fogged up. (Tr. 74) -"They were getting pretty 
well fogged up by that time· (When the car reached :Mr. 
Williams' house). The (windshield) was getting dim 
where it was hard to see through the windshield. As we 
continued to go north, the windows frosted up more." 
( Tr. 75) Q. "And could you see out of the windshield 
in front of Mr. Gull~" A. "No, I was pretty well blocked 
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from any side." Q. ''could you see over to the left of 
the windshield by Mr. :Mower~" A." Very little .... You 
can't fix to judge the speed if you can't see out." 
On cross-examination (rrr. 86) plaintiff testified, 
"Wouldn't anybody have a fear in their heart if they 
couldn't see out and going, riding in the car~" Q. "And 
the windows were so fogged you couldn't see out~" A. 
"Yes." 
(Tr. 89) Q. """\Vell, then will you please tell us, Mr. 
Jensen, why you were uneasy in the car~" A. "Well, I 
just think it was on account of me being in the dark and 
going. I think anyone W10uld be." 
Q. "You mean in the back seat, where you couldn't 
see~" A. "Yes." (Tr. 90) Q. "And you couldn't even see 
a thing through the right half of the windshield~" A. 
"No." 
Q. "Now isn't it true that the left half of the wind-
shield was clear~" A. "Not very much of it ... there 
was fog on the left hand side, but it wasn't all fogged up." 
(Tr. 93) " ... It was just like going somewhere in th~ 
dark." 
On the question of defendant's negligence, therefore, 
the jury must have found that the defendant was driving 
in a heavy, thick fog in the nighttime (of which plaintiff, 
of course, was well aware); that defendant's speed was 
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40 ~LPII (the opinion of the plaintiff at the time) ; that 
the visibility through the fog was not over 50 to 100 
feet (which the plaintiff also knew); that the roadway 
appeared icy (the plaintiff at least having knowledge of 
this possibility as he testified (at Tr. 85) that he felt the 
ear ~kid in front of l\lr. William's home) ; that the right 
windshield was cmnpletely fogged up, and that there was 
only a ~mall opening in the left windshield, through which 
the plaintiff, and therefore the defendant, could see 
''Very little." 
l 7 nder these conditions pl:aintiff made no protest 
whatsoever, nor did he request the defendant, at any 
time, to slow down, stop and clear his windows, or, in fact, 
n1ake any indication to the defendant that he, the plain-
tiff, was in any way worried by the manner of the de-
fendant's driving, or the lack of visibility from inside the 
car. 
':l"'·he plaintiff testified (Tr. 91) : 
"Q. Now as you reached the Farmington Under-
pass and when the passengers were alleged to 
have made these statements, did you say 
anything to him? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you at the ti1ne feel that it was getting 
dangerous~ 
A. Well, I did, but I put my trust in him and I 
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don't think it's right for all drivers to advise 
the driver. 
Q. If you felt that you might get injured, don't 
you feel that you would be justified in asking 
Mr. Mower if he wouldn't mind slowing down 
or cleaning his windshield, or something t 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you don't like to be a back seat driver? 
A. That's right. 
Q. So that you decided that you would just take 
the gamble and hope that you made it? 
A. That's right." 
The remarks made to the defendant by the other 
drivers could have hardly been sufficient to replace plain-
tiff's own objection to the very dangerous situation which 
the jury apparently decided prevailed. Those remarks 
were made by l\1 r. Gull, riding in the front seat, and ~fr. 
Williams, in the rear seat, the testimony of these wit-
nesses being: 
Mr. Gull: (Tr. 101) 
"Well, all I can recollect of that is I told 
Frank, I said, 'My side is getting fogged up. 
Can you see out of yours~' I remember Frank 
saying, 'Yes, I can see out of mine.',. 
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Mr. Williams: (Tr. 123) 
"I remarked, and I hated to, I don't like to 
be a back se~at driver. I remarked something 
like, 'Aren't we going a little fast 1' 
Q. And what did Mr. Mower say, if anything~" 
A. I don't recall. I don't believe he answered 
unless he just said, 'Yeah,' or something like 
that. 
Q. And did he make any change in the speed of 
the car1 
A. He may have dropped down some.'' 
At T'r. 1'2·5, the witness testified: 
"He dropped it (his speed) a little ... I would 
say 2 or 3 miles per hour and then I think he went 
back up from there." 
The above conversations took place at the Farming-
ton Underpass, or about two miles from the scene of the 
accident. 
Certainly the remarks made by the other riders did 
not have a noticeable and immediate effect upon the man-
ner in which the defendant was driving, and the condi-
tion of the fogged windshields and the side windows was 
certainly not improved. Yet despite the lack of any im-
mediate response from the defendant to the remarks 
made, the plaintiff made no statement whatsoever, but in-
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stead, as he ad1nitted on the stand, he decided to take tl1e 
gamble and hope that he made it. 
The plaintiff admitted that he had a ''fear in his 
heart"; that he was "intense"; that he felt that the situa-
tion was dangerous. 
Under those conditions the normal, prudent rider, 
in order to protect hilnself from the danger which was so 
apparent most certainly would and should have protested, 
or at least strongly requested the driver to slow up, or 
to stop and clear his windshield. 
The half-hearted remarks made by the other riders, 
with no immediate result upon the defendant, cannot sub-
stitute for a more vigorous protest frorn the plaintiff, 
which, in all probability, would have had the desired re-
sponse from the driver. But without some effort on the 
plaintiff's part to lessen the dangerous situation, he can-
not now be heard to complain that the gamble which he 
took, a calculated risk, failed. 
Furthermore, there was ample testimony that mois-
ture inside the vehicle collected upon the windshield and 
the other windows during this cold, freezing morning. 
The plaintiff was so concerned with his own comfort 
that he did not roll the window down to air out the in-
terior, and free the inside of the glass of" fog", because 
(Tr. 86) "it was too cold." 
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The plaintiff contended that he was a paying pas-
senger in defendant's automobile. The authorities are 
clear that even if he were, he is under a duty to use rea-
sonable precautions for his own safety. 
4 BLASHFIELD, CYC. OF AUTO. LAW AND 
PRA'CTICE, SEC. 2217, at Page 2217, in discussing pas-
~en,ger~ in taxicabs, stated: 
"While the primary duty to care for the safety 
of passengers rests upon the driver of a taxicab, 
a passenger being under no duty, except in ex-
ceptional cases, to be on the lookout for possible 
dangers, yet circumstances may arise which are 
such as to impose such a duty on the passenger 
in order for his conduct to conform to that of a 
reasonably prudent person. While the n1ere speed 
at which a taxicab is driven is ordinarily not a 
matter with which a passenger may need concern 
himself, yet, if it is driven at a speed dangerous 
under all the circun1stances or dangerous under 
the particular circumstances, and the passenger 
has an opportunity to protect against the speed, 
his failure to do so may prevent his recovery for 
an injury resulting fro~m the excessive speed, if 
an ordinarily prudent person, under the circum-
stances, would have cautioned the driver." 
In GARRO'V v. SEATTLE TAXI'CAB CO. - 135 
WASH. 630,238 P. 623, the Court states: 
" .... if the automobile be driven at a speed 
dangerous under all the circumstances, or danger-
ous under the particular circumstances, and the 
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passenger had an opportunity to warn or protect 
against the speed and failed so to do, clearly he 
could not recover against the owner for an injury 
resulting from the excessive speed .... it is not 
rea.sonable prudence for one to remniu ]Jatssit'e 
while another negligently subjects him to an 7f·n-
necessary danger, when ,an opportnnity to act is 
present." 
In CAPERON v. TUTTLE (UTAH) 11G P2d 402, 
the facts were that plaintiff, a guest in defendant's car, 
was riding in the rear seat when he saw sheep on the 
road ahead and cried out a warning about the same time 
that defendant applied his brakes. This Court stated at 
Page 405: 
"As we have heretofore stated, any negligence 
of the driver was not imputable to his guest. 
Nevertheless, if the jury found that the driver was 
negligent, it could ... have considered whether 
or not (plaintiff) was, or should have been, aware 
of such negligence and was, therefore, under a 
duty to warn said driver of the danger involved 
and endeavor to influence him to exercise greater 
caution, and further, whether or not anything that 
plaintiff might have done would have influenced 
the driver to greater care and thus have avoided 
the accident." 
GILMAN v. OLSON, 125 OR.1, 265 P439; COWAN 
v. SALT LAKE & 0. R. CO. 5G UTAH 94, 189 P. 599. 
In the case at Bar, and again referring to the re-
marks made by witnesses Gull and Williams, the plain-
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tiff (at Tr. 75) testified: 
"We went under the Underpass there by 
Lagoon. I can remember of going under the Under-
pass. But before we went under the Underpass 
I heard l\ir. Williams ask him if he wasn't going 
too fast and he said no. And I seen him go under 
the Underpass and then Mr. Gull said, afteT the 
Underpass, that he couldn't see out of his side of 
the windshield ... and Mr. l\{ower s·aid that he 
could and kept a going. So I was just in·tense." 
The Court: "So you were what~" 
A. "Intense." 
In answer to the question of Mr. Williams, "Aren't 
we going a little fast~", Mr. Mower either made no reply, 
or he said "yeah" or ''No". The witnesses' recollections 
were not in accord. 
But regardless of his reply, there was no noticeable 
reaction from the driver, unless he dropped his speed 
2 to 3 miles per hour, and then picked the ~peed back 
up again, which Mr. Williams testified he "may" have 
done. 
In any event, the plaintiff himself believing the situ-
ation dangerous some two miles from the point of the 
accident; knowing the atmospheric conditions; completely 
unable to see out of the ear windows, except "very little" 
throughout the left front windshield glass; himself of 
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the opinion that the car was going 40 miles per hour; 
and knowing from past experience that the roadway was 
amptly wide enough to stop the car against the east edge 
so that the windshields could he cleared, cannot, as a 
reasonable and prudent person passively sit by and 
gamble with his own safety. 
564. 
Again in Blashfield, Vol. 4, Sec. 2414 at pages 563,-
"It is a general rule, however, that the guest 
will be considered to acquiesce in any course of 
driving persisted in sufficiently long to give him 
an opportunity to protest and thereby indicate his 
dissent or disapproval of the manner of driving. 
A passenger, even one who is a gratuitous guest, 
in an automobile cannot sit idly by observe clear 
violations of the law or a steady course of negli-
gent conduct, in such ways, for example, as by the 
operation of the vehicle at an excessive speed or 
the like, and acquiesce therein and then be per-
mitted to hold the operator or third persons liable 
for the damage resulting fron1 such violation of 
legal duty. As said by the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana . . . the theory underlying this rule is 
that of assent to and acquiescence in the driver's 
negligence." 
There is then cited by the text at note 59, page 570; 
" ... a finding of the jury that plaintiff was 
not negligent is against the manifest weight of 
the evidence, where the collision occurred on a 
dark, foggy and misty night, where the driver 
of the car in which the plaintiff was riding testi-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
50 
fied that he was dri,·ing between 1S and 20 miles 
an hour, although he could not see more than 8 to 
10 feet ahead, and where plaintiff who was 
sitting beside the driver rnade no rernonstrance 
or objection of any kind as to the speed at which 
the automobile was being driven. l\icDermott v. 
:McKeown Transp. Co., 263 Ill. App. 325." 
The Utah Supreme Court, in IIillyard vs. l~tah By-
Products Co., 263 Pac. 2nd at page 289 has stated the 
rule in this respect as follows: 
"Ordinarily (the guest) has the right to 
plaee smne reliance upon prudence, care and 
skillfullness of the driver. It is only when the 
guest knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care 
should know that the driver lacked such qualities, 
or is being careless that it becomes the guest's 
duty to consider doing something about the oper-
ation of the car. In the Esernia case cited by 
defendant, where such duty was recognized, the 
passengers were fully aware of the sleepy con-
dition of the driver; he had already run off the 
road o.nce and had stated that he was so sleepy 
that he didn't know whether he could keep awake, 
after "·hich there had been ample opportunity 
to leave the truck. Likewise in the case of l\iaybee 
v. :Jr ayhet>,3 the plaintiff, whose mother was the 
driver, knew of her mother's nearsightedness and 
that she \Ya~ driving without glasses; so she was 
fullv a ware of the serious defect in her mother's 
ability to drive safely, yet she acquiesced in the 
situation and abandoned the care of the car to 
her rnother to such an extent that she was content 
to read a book during the drive." 
2. Esernia v. Overland :Moving Co., 115 Utah 
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519, 206 P. 2nd 621. 
3. 79 Utah ;)85, ll P :2nd 973. 
See also Cowan v. Nalt Lake & U. Hy. Co. (Utah) 
189 Pac. 605. 
It is therefore submitted ,that the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law; he ac<tuiesced 
in the manner in which the defendant was driving under 
the very dangerous conditions which the jury found ex-
isted; he made no protest or suggestion to the defendant 
whatsoever, although he had ample opportunity to do so 
inasmuch as the dangerous circumstances existed miles 
before the accident occurred. 
The jury's finding that plaintiff was free of negli-
gence was clearly against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 12 INVADED 
THE PROVINCE OF THE JURY, AND WAS REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
Instruction No. 12 was as follows: 
"You are instructed that if you believe from 
a preponderance of the evidence that defendant, 
Frank Mower, knew or should have known that 
he was traveling on icy roads, then if you further 
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find that a person under the circumstances of this 
case would not as a reasonable and prudent man, 
have applied his brakes, then you shall find that in 
so doing he was negligent." 
The Court, b;· this instruction, assumed the following 
facts, which were at issue : 
1. 'rhat the defendant applied his brakes before the 
car started skidding. 
2. ~rhat the application of the brakes was negligent-
ly done, whether touched lightly to slow the speed of the 
car, or jammed vigorously to stop. 
3. That the application of the brakes, regardless of 
how applied, was a proximate cause of the accident. 
It ·was a jury question as to whether the defendant 
actually applied his brakes; and if applied, whether they 
were applied before or after the car started skidding. 
It was a jury question as to whether the defendant negli-
gently applied his brakes, it being the testimony of the de-
fendant that, if he applied his brakes at all, he merely 
"touched" his brakes, which we submit would not be 
negligence in any event; and it was a jury question as to 
whether the application of the brakes was a proximate 
cause of the accident, it being the contention of the de-
fendant that the car skidded on the solid ice surface pri-
Inarily fron1 the attempt to turn from one lane to the 
other to avoid the stopped car ahead. 
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At Tr. 159 the defendant testified: 
''Well, I naturally wondered what 'vas in 
front of n1e. I turned to the left and I guess I 
touched my brakes and my right end just came on 
around and cut the front end." 
Again, on Cross Examination at Page 164: 
"Well, as I discovered these tail lights were 
stopped I naturally turned to the left and I 
imagine I hit my brakes. I don't even remember 
that I hit my brakes but my right end came 
around." 
At Page 168: 
"Well, I imagine I was going about the same 
speed as I was when I touched my brakes because 
it didn't seem to slow up. The rear end just whip-
ped right around." 
On Re-Direct, at Page 173: 
"Why I turned to the left to turn around him 
and I naturally wanted to see what was in front 
of him. I wanted to slow down and see if there 
was something in front of him .... I had no idea 
there was going to be an accident at that time .... 
I just merely intended to turn around him and 
slow down in case there was something in front of 
him .... " 
The Court's instruction, therefore, completely di~­
regarded defendant's testimony. The jury had a right to 
believe the defendant and to believe that the application 
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of the brakes was either made after the car started skid-
ding; that the defendant, even if he knew that the high-
way was icy, was not negligent in lightly "touching" the 
brake pedal; and that the application of the brakes, in any 
event, wa~ not a proximate cause of the accident. 
The highway patrol officer who testified at Tr. 29, 
while reviewing his findings at the scene, based on his 
oh~ervation and inquiry of the drivers involved, stated: 
"The 1947 Nash came along ... touched his 
brakes, his car went into a skid, etc." 
lt is co1nmon lmowledge that brakes on vehicles must 
be used, even if the roadway is solid ice. The careful 
driver applies his brakes under these circumstances by a 
light application ··touching" and in a pumping action. It 
is, of course, careless to ''jain" the brakes. But, whether 
the defendant carefully ''touched" his brakes or "jam-
med" then1 in an effort to stop, was a vital question for 
the jury. 
The Court's instruction clearly stating that if the 
jury should find that the defendant should have known 
that the road was icy and applied his brakes, no matter 
how he applies them, and regardless of whether he ap-
plied then1 before or after the car started skidding, the 
defendant would then be negligent, was clearly error 
prejudicial to the defendant. 
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It is also common knowledge that the mere turning 
of the front wheels on Rolid ice can and very frequently 
does cause a car to skid, with no application of the brakes. 
Plaintiff's own witness, Everley, testified (at Tr. 110) 
that while he was following the gradual curve under the 
Underpass at Farmington, he felt his car skid, but he was 
able to right it and proceed. Until that time he thought 
the road was wet but not slippery (Tr. 112). At any rate, 
he certainly was not applying his brakes at the time his 
car started skidding. 
The defendant testified, as indicated above, that he 
turned and then may have touched his brakes, but in any 
event, the car started skidding immediately. The order 
of his actions, however, was first, to turn to his left to 
change lanes, and second, to touch his brakes to slow 
down (if in fact he applied his brakes at all). The instruc-
tion completely took these· factors from the jury, by as-
suming that the negligent application of the brakes caused 
the car to skid. 
We, therefore, submit that the jury could have hardly 
thought other than this: 
The issue for the jury's determination was whether 
the defendant knew or should have known that the road 
was icy at the scene of the accident. If the jury found in 
the affirmative, then the defendant was negligent, inas-
much as he applied his brakes negligently, which caused 
the car to skid and collide with the stopped vehicle. 
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\Ye further submit that even assuming that the de-
fendant knew that the road was icy, the jury had a right 
to find that the defendant's action in atten1pting to change 
lanes, and lightly touching his brakes, for the purpose of 
slowing the speed of his car until he could determine what 
was ahead of the stopped car, was not negligence, and 
that the defendant acted in those respects in accordance 
with the actions of the reasonable and prudent motorist 
under the circun1stances. 
\V e believe the instruction was further erroneous in 
that it did not state the alternative to the proposition 
stated, and therefore over-accentuated the plaintiff's 
theory of the case. 
For the above reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the defendant is entitled to a reversal of the judg-
~ent, and a new trial. 
POINT FOUR 
THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE PREJUDICIALLY ERRON-
EOUS IN THAT THEY WERE CONTRADICTORY AND CON-
FUSING AND INCORRECTLY STATED THE LAW. 
The instructions to which we refer as contradictory 
and confusing, and which incorrectly state the law applic-
able to the facts of the case at bar, are herewith quoted: 
Instruction No. 8. 
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You are instructed that it is negligent as a matter 
of law for a person to drive an automobile upon a travel-
ed public highway used by vehicles at such a rate of speed 
tha.t said automobile cannot be stozJped 1uithin the dis-
tance at which the operator of the automobile is able to 
see objects upon the li i.r;lnray in front of him. 
Instruction No. 10 . 
. . . In erery event the speed shall be so c:onirolled as 
may be necessary to avoi.d collid:i,n.g with any person, 
vehicle or other conveyance on the highway and the duty 
of all persons to use due care. 
Instruction No. 11. 
It is the duty of the driver of a motor vehicle to be 
diligent at all times, keeping a reasonable lookout for 
possible danger to himself or others, and to keep the 
motor vehicle he is driving under such control that to 
avoid a collision he can stop a.s quickly as might be re-
quired of him by eventualities that would be anticipated 
by an ordinary, prudent person in like position. 
T nstruction No. 12. 
You are instructed that if you believe from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that defendant, Frank Mower, 
knew or should have known that he was traveling on icy 
roads, and if you further find that a person under the 
circumstances of this case would not as a reasonable and 
prudent man have applied his brakes, then you shall find 
that in so doing he was negligent. 
Instruction No. 13. 
You are instructed that if you believe from a pre-
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ponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Frank 
1fower, could have passed to the left of the auton1obi!e 
parked on the highway and he should ha,ve done so In 
the exercise of due care of a reasonably prudent man 
then you will find that he was negligent in failing to do 
so. 
In effect, therefore, the jury was instructed in Num-
bers S and 11 that the defendant was under a duty to 
stop (with no mention made of "avoid") upon seeing a 
vehicle ahead in his headlights, yet in Number 12 the jury 
was instructed that if the defendant knew the road was 
icy and atte1npted to stop by applying his brakes to stop, 
he \vas negligent, if the reasonable prudent man would 
not have applied his brakes, even in the slightest degree. 
The jury, under those instructions, could well assume that 
the la\Y requires a motorist, travelling on icy roads, to 
travel at such a speed that he can stop without the appli-
cation of brakes at all, or that if he does apply brakes, 
he does so at his own risk, inasmuch as he will be deemed 
negligent if an accident occurs, regardless of the circum-
stances. 
Instruction No. 10 goes further by saying that "in 
eL:ery event" the speed 1nust be controlled so as to avoid 
an accident, even, we presume, if it be conceded that the 
car with which the accident occurs is stopped blocking 
traffic in violation of the law, or the other n1otorist is 
operating his vehicle in a highly reckless manner. This 
instruction, clearly stating that there are no exceptions 
to the rule of law stated, is clearly contrary to the law 
as stated by this Court, as indicated infra page ------· 
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It is further confusing, and must have been so to the 
jury, to be instructed, in Number 13, in effect that e'Ten 
though the law requires the defendant to stop, if the de-
fendant, as a reasonable man, cotdd have or shouid have 
passed on the left of the stopped vehicle, and he failed 
to do so, (which was obvious because of the fact that the 
accident happened) then the defendant was negligent. 
Instruction No. 13 was very prejudicial. It permit-
ted the jury to determine by hindsight what was admitted 
by the evidence, that there was sufficient room on the left 
of the stopped car for the defendant's vehicle to pass. 
If all that the jury had to determine was whether the de-
fendant ''could" have passed, there would have been no 
need for a law suit. Of course he ''could" have passed, 
in the sense that it was not an impossibility to do so. 
The instruction then, in effect, asks the jury whether the 
defendant "should" have passed the car. Again, using 
hindsight, there is no question that he'' should" have done 
so, if for no other reason than it would have been highly 
more desirable for everyone concerned that he do so. 
Can any one say that he should have collided with the 
car? There has never yet been an automobile accident 
which should have happened, and we feel certain no jury 
has ever yet so found. 
The plaintiff will undoubtedly contend that the 
Court's Instruction Number 17 (which was requested by 
defendant) clarifies any confusion which might have been 
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present in the n1inds of the jury. We believe Number 17 
to correctly state the law, but the jury, after being in-
structed in N u1nbers 8, 10, 11, 12 and 13, could not help 
but be further confused by Instruction Number 17. In 
other words after having been told that, in effect, the 
defendant is under the duty to stop, or that if there were 
room enough to pass the stopped vehicle on its left and 
he failed to do so he is negligent, with no exception, and 
that "in any event" he rnust avoid an accident, then the 
jury could not help but be confused by then being in-
structed, as in Nu1nber 17, that there are exceptions after 
all. 
In 53 Am. Juris. Trial, Sec. 557, page 442: 
"Instructions as a whole must be consistent 
and harmonious, not conflicting and contradictory. 
This is true although one of the instructions cor-
rectly states the law as applicable to the facts of 
the case, since the correct instruction cannot cure 
the error in the contradictory, erroneous instruc-
tion. Inconsistent instructions are calculated to 
n1islead and confuse the jury, since the jury are 
thereby left in doubt and without any certain 
guide as to the law arising upon the evidence." 
vV e submit that the Court's instructions were not 
tailored to the fact situations present in this case. The 
Court's instruction on the duty of a motorist to drive 
at such a speed that he can stop within the distance of 
his headlights would be entirely correct, if the accident 
had occured on the normal two lane highway, one lane 
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for each direction. A motorist on such a highway, of 
course, must anticipate that he may encounter an object 
ahead at the same time that an opposite bound car is 
approaching, which may require a complete stop in order 
to avoid a collision with the object ahead, as well as to 
avoid a head-on collision with the opposite bound car. 
But that situation was not present in the case at bar. 
Here the defendant was proceeding north on a two 
lane, one way hi.ghway, with no possibility at all of an 
opposite bound car preventing the defendant from pass-
ing any object in the lane ahead. 
It is common knowledge that a motorist can, with 
little or no effort, move his vehicle from one lane to 
another and pass an obstacle blocking the one lane, where-
as it might, under the circumstances, be impossible and 
unnecessary to completely stop behind that object. 
To hold, however, even under these facts, that the 
defendant nevertheless, is still under the duty to drive 
at such a speed that he can completely stop behind a 
vehicle which he suddenly observes illegally stopped in 
the one lane ahead, would require a complete disregard 
of the practical factors of driving at night. 
In l\fOSS vs. CHRISTENSEN - GARDNER, INC. 
(Utah) 98 Pac. 2nd at 367, Justice Wolfe, in his concur-
ring opinion, states: 
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"The instant decision conunendably departs 
fron1 the severe logic of the Dalley case (Dalley v. 
l\1:idwestern Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 
P. 2nd 309) in order to make the law comport not 
w·ith logic but with realities-a very welcome 
syn1ptom. The logic of the Dalley case would re-
quire that a driver blinded by lights stop until the 
blindness disappears. There is in logic no more 
reason why a man should proceed when unable 
to see objects because of being blinded by the 
lights of some other car than when unable to see 
them by the lights of his own car. But as stated 
in my dissenting opinion in Farrell v. Cameron, 
94 P.2d 1068, some concession must be made to 
actualities. In that case, the implication was that 
a 1nan on his own side of the road blinded bv 
oncon1ing lights was under a. duty to discover a~ 
oncoming person on the wrong side of the road. 
Of course, such law would make driving at night 
on much used arterials practically an impossi-
bility." 
\Ve sub1nit that the same reasoning applies to the 
case at bar. A 1notorist, even in fog, is entitled to proceed 
in hi:-: lawful use of the highway. That motorist, with 
the knowledge that he is using a wide, two lane, one way 
thoroughfare, with no possibility of opposite bound cars, 
is not negligent if he drives at a speed which would 
pennit hin1 to aroid, by passing, an object stopped in 
the lane ahead; and this, even though he were unable to 
actuall:· stop within the sa1ne distance which permitted 
a safe passing. 
For example, Blashfield Cycl. of Auto. Law and 
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Practice, Yol. 1, Part 2, Page G95, Sec. 751, it is stated: 
"Suppose a motorist is traveling at the rate 
of 40 miles an hour. At that speed, allowing for 
for the three-fourths of a second that is required 
for the average driver to react to a warning, an 
automobile with brakes in excellent condition can 
be stopped in 115 feet. If the headlights reveal an 
object just 115 feet ahead, then the motorist is 
traveling within the radius of his lights, and is 
able to avoid a collision, provided that when the 
object is first discerned the surrounding circum-
stances suggest danger, and the need for an 
emergency stop. If a second passes before the 
motorist perceives indications of danger, and a 
''stop" signal flashes to his brain, the automobile 
during that second has travelled 59 feet. The 
object is then only 56 feet away, and it is too late 
to stop, and may be too late even to swerve so as 
to avoid a collision, since the actual stopping dis-
tance at 40 miles per hour is 71 feet." 
The defendant in the case at bar testified that when 
he realized that the car ahead was stopped, it wa~ I;) to 
100 feet distant. The three-fourths second lapse before 
defendant could react \vould result in the car travelling 
4-±.25 feet. The defendant, therefore, had 30.75 to 55.75 
feet to stop or t11rn and pass the vehicle ahead. Quite 
obviously, the defendant could not possibly have stopped, 
and indeed there was no need for him to do so, as there 
was a lane of travel wide open on his left. It is submitted 
that in that distance, under conditions which prevailed, 
the jury could properly have determined that the defen-
dant was not negligent merely because of the fact that 
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his automobile skidded. (Yol. 1 Blashfield, Cyc. Auto. 
La'" & Practice, page 680, sec. 749); nor that he was 
driving too fast under the conditions; nor that he was 
keeping an ilnproper lookout. 
But the jury having been instructed, in Instructions 
No. 8 and 11, that the law requires that the motorist be 
able to stop within the distance objects ahead can be 
seen, with no 1nention in those same instructions con-
cerning the n1otorist's ability to avoid the said object, 
was certainly n1isleading and did not properly state the 
law applicable tn this case, and made it incumbent on 
the jury to find the defendant negligent. 
For the above reasons, the instructions were pre-
judicially erroneous. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS E. MIDGLEY, 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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